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Abstract. The Shapley value is arguably the most central normative
solution concept in cooperative game theory. It specifies a unique way in
which the reward from cooperation can be “fairly” divided among play-
ers. While it has a wide range of real world applications, its use is in
many cases hampered by the hardness of its computation. A number of
researchers have tackled this problem by (i) focusing on classes of games
where the Shapley value can be computed efficiently, or (ii) proposing
representation formalisms that facilitate such efficient computation, or
(iii) approximating the Shapley value in certain classes of games. For
the classical characteristic function representation, the only attempt to
approximate the Shapley value for the general class of games is due to
Castro et al. [5]. While this algorithm provides a bound on the approxi-
mation error, this bound is asymptotic, meaning that it only holds when
the number of samples increases to infinity. On the other hand, when a
finite number of samples is drawn, an unquantifiable error is introduced,
meaning that the bound no longer holds. With this in mind, we provide
non-asymptotic bounds on the estimation error for two cases: where (i)
the variance, and (ii) the range, of the players’ marginal contributions is
known. Furthermore, for the second case, we show that when the range
is significantly large relative to the Shapley value, the bound can be im-
proved (from O(r/m) to O(
√
r/m)). Finally, we propose, and demonstrate
the effectiveness of using stratified sampling for improving the bounds
further.
Keywords: Shapley value, Approximation algorithm, Game theory
1 Introduction
The Shapley value is a key solution concept in cooperative game theory. To
date, this value has been applied to a multitude of problems, including resolv-
ing political conflicts [10], identifying key members in terrorists networks [18,20],
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analysing customer satisfaction [7], factorizing the risk of diseases [16], and shar-
ing costs in problems such as railways infrastructure [13] and multicast trans-
mission [12]. The large literature that has grown out of Shapley’s paper is a
testimony to its importance both theoretically and practically.
The large literature that has grown out of Shapley’s original paper [22] is
a testimony to its importance both theoretically and practically. Nevertheless,
in the general case, computing the Shapley value has an exponential time com-
plexity, thus limiting its use to games with relatively small numbers (e.g., tens)
of players. To address this issue, some researchers have focused on certain, re-
stricted classes of games for which they were able to develop efficient exact
algorithms [2,8]. Other researchers have focused on other restricted classes of
games for which they propose approximate solutions [21,3,17]. Another related
line of research has focused on computing the Shapley value using alternative
representation formalisms, as opposed to the standard characteristic function
representation where no assumption is made about how coalition values are
computed [15,9,1].
As for the general class of games in characteristic function form, the only
approximation algorithm in the literature is due to Castro et al. [5]. In particular,
they use random sampling to approximate the Shapley value in games where the
variance of the marginal contributions of the players is known. At first glance the
bound that they establish, based on the central limit theorem (CLT), may seem
correct. However, we highlight in this paper an error term that is not factored in
by Castro et al. in their bound. This error is due to the asymptotic assumption
that lies at the heart of the CLT; the results therein only hold as the sample size
increases to infinity. Conversely, when the CLT is applied with a finite number of
samples drawn from an unknown distribution, it is known that an unquantifiable
error to the bound will be introduced (see Section 3.2 for a detailed explanation).
With an unquantifiable error, the possibility of a significant impact on the bound
cannot be ruled out. As such, ignoring this error results in an inaccurate bound.
In summary, despite the growing research on the computational aspects of
game theory, and in particular cooperative game theory [6], the problem of ap-
proximating the Shapley value for the general class of games is still open. By
“the general class of games” we shall mean the class of transferable utility co-
operative games in characteristic function form where the value of a coalition is
given by an oracle.
Ideally, an approximation algorithm would establish a tight bound on its
error. The quality of this bound depends on how much information is available
from the problem. Let us observe that in the general class of games, there is no
information that can be exploited to establish a bound on the Shapley value.
Therefore, we have to assume that at least some limited information is available
from the problem instance.
Against this background, we use existing results from probability theory to
approximate and establish a bound on the Shapley value of a player. Specifically,
we use two techniques, namely (i) simple random sampling, and (ii) stratified
sampling, to estimate the Shapley value. In the former, samples are drawn uni-
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formly from a population, while in the latter, a population is stratified (i.e.,
partitioned into “strata”), such that samples are drawn from each stratum in-
dependently. Furthermore, we use non-asymptotic concentration inequalities to
bound the estimation error. Specifically, our contribution to the state of the art
can be summarized as follows:
– In the context of simple random sampling, we consider two cases, depend-
ing on the information available regarding the marginal contributions of a
player: (i) when their variance is known, we use Chebyshev’s inequality; and
(ii) when their range (i.e., the difference between the minimum and maxi-
mum marginal contributions) is known, we use Hoeffding’s inequality [14].
As opposed to Castro et al.’s bound, which only holds asymptotically (i.e.,
when the number of samples increases to infinity), our bounds hold when
the number of samples we draw is finite.
– We show that when the range of the marginal contributions is known, and is
significantly large relative to the Shapley value, the bound can be improved
from O(r/m) to O(
√
r/m), where r is the range and m is the sample size.
– We propose the use of stratified sampling for approximating the Shapley
value. As a proof of concept, we demonstrate the effectiveness of this tech-
nique, by applying it to a class of games where every coalition’s value is
bounded by a linear function of the coalition’s size.
Note that the use of Hoeffding’s and Chebyshev’s inequalities were also proposed
by others in the literature (see Section 3). However, these were only used for
simple games and supermodular games. Also note that our sampling algorithm
for the first two cases is similar to Castro et al.’s [5]; the difference lies in the
bounds that we provide. As such, the novelty of our paper lies in the introduction
of the said inequalities to approximating the general case of the Shapley value,
as well as the use of stratified sampling to obtain a more efficient bound.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides preliminaries
and basic notations. Section 3 gives an overview of the related work. Section 4 dis-
cusses how the estimation error can be bounded using simple random sampling.
Section 5 demonstrates the potential of using stratified sampling to approximate
the Shapley value. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper and outlines the future
direction.
2 Preliminaries
Given a set, N , of n players, each labeled by i (i ∈ N), a coalition C is defined
as a subset of N . The coalition N is called the grand coalition. Any coalition has
a value which is given by a characteristic function v. This function maps each
subset of N to a real number, i.e., v : 2N → R. The pair (N, v) specifies a unique
cooperative game in characteristic function form.
Given a player, i, and a coalition, C ⊆ N\{i}, the marginal contribution of
i to C, is the difference in value that i makes by joining C, which is calculated
as: v(C ∪ {i})− v(C).
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A coalition consisting of n players can form in n! ways if we consider all the
possible joining orders of the players. In each joining order, as a player steps in
the coalition, it makes a marginal contribution to the players that have joined
before him. Viewing this joining process as a stochastic variable, with all joining
orders having the same probability of forming (i.e., 1/n!), the Shapley value of
a player would be his expected marginal contribution. Denote by π(N) the set
of all permutations of the players in N , each of which representing a distinct
joining order. Furthermore, denote by POi the set of players that precede i in
the permutation O. The Shapley value of i can be calculated as:
φ[i, v] =
1
n!
∑
O∈π(N)
[
v(POi ∪ {i})− v(POi )
]
=
∑
C⊆N\{i}
|C|! (n− |C| − 1)!
n!
(v(C ∪ {i})− v(C)) (1)
=
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
∑
|C|=k,{i}6∈C
1(
n−1
k
) (v(C ∪ {i})− v(C)) (2)
The Shapley value satisfies the axioms of symmetry, efficiency and additivity.
Symmetry states that if two players make the same marginal contributions to
any coalition, their value is equal. The efficiency axiom implies that the value of
the grand coalition is fully divided. Finally, the additivity means that if a new
game is obtained by adding two different games with the same set of players,
the value of a player in the new game is equal to the sum of his values in the
two games. These three axioms define the ‘value’ of a game uniquely [22].
3 Related Work
As we mentioned in the introduction, almost all of the existing research on
approximating the Shapley value focused on restricted classes of games. In this
section, we give a brief overview of the notable works in this direction. We then
proceed by explaining why the CLT cannot be relied upon to establish a bound
on the approximation in the general case as Castro et al. do. Finally, we close
this section by giving a background on the concentration bounds that we will
use in our results.
3.1 Efficiently computing or approximating the Shapley value
One line of research has focused on studying special classes of games where
the Shapley value can be computed efficiently. For instance, Ando focused on
minimum cost spanning tree games [2], while Deng and Papadimitriou focused
on induced subgraph games [8].
In another line of research, approximation methods have been proposed for
certain classes of games, where the exact computation is intractable. For in-
stance, Mann and Shapley proposed a Monte Carlo simulation method for es-
timating the Shapley value in voting games in linear time [19]. Owen proposed
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a multilinear extension method with which the Shapley value in weighted vot-
ing games can be approximated in linear time [21]. Bachrach et al. proposed a
sampling algorithm for approximating the Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf power
indices, and used Hoeffding’s inequality [14] to establish a bound on their ap-
proximation [3]. Fatima et al. put forward a linear-time approximation algorithm
for k-majority games [11]. Liben-Nowell et al. proposed a polynomial time algo-
rithm for supermodular games, and used Chebyshev’s inequality to bound the
approximated Shapley value [17].
Another relevant line of research is concerned with proposing alternative
representation formalisms, where non-restrictive assumptions are made on the
way coalition values are computed (as opposed to the classical characteristic
function representation where no such assumptions are made). For instance, the
marginal contribution nets representation, proposed by Ieong and Shoham [15]
and extended by Elkind et al. [9], allows for computing the Shapley value in
time linear in the size of the input. Similarly, Aadithya et al. proposed another
representation based on algebraic decision diagrams, where the Shapley value
can be computed in polynomial time [1].
3.2 Estimating the Shapley value using the Central Limit Theorem
Estimating a population parameter such as the mean is a very common task
in statistics. The typical technique to estimate the population mean is to draw
random samples from the population (known as simple random sampling) and
calculate their mean. If a sufficiently large number of samples is drawn, the mean
of the samples (known as the sample mean) tends to be a good estimate of the
population mean. The typical question in this case is how far the sample mean
can be from the population mean. Often researchers resort to constructing a
confidence interval to provide an answer.
If we view the Shapley value as the mean of a population of marginal con-
tributions of a player, which has an unknown distribution, the link between
the random sampling method and estimating the Shapley value becomes clear.
Castro et al. use a simple random sampling algorithm and provide a confidence
interval based on the CLT [5]. In what follows, we show why using the CLT
results in an inaccurate confidence interval.
If we repeat the process of sampling, each time a possibly different mean is
obtained. This observation allows us to view the sample mean itself as a random
variable with some probability distribution. Informally, the CLT states that as
the number of samples that we draw increases to infinity, the distribution of
the sample mean converges to a normal distribution whose mean is equal to the
mean of the original population, and whose variance is equal to the variance of
the samples divided by the sample size. This raises two crucial questions. First,
what is the convergence rate? Second, if we draw a finite number of samples,
what will be the error, i.e., the difference between the true distribution of the
sample mean and the asymptotic normal distribution?
In theory, one way to obtain the convergence rate and an upper bound on the
error is to use the Berry-Esseen theorem [4], which, unfortunately, only holds
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under some strong assumptions. Unless we know the population distribution,
neither of the above questions can be answered in practice. Therefore, it is not
possible to quantify the error, and as such, ignoring it results in an inaccurate
bound. Note that the closer the population distribution is to normal, the lower
the error would be. However, in the general class of games, the marginal contri-
butions of a player could follow any distribution.
3.3 Concentration inequalities
Concentration inequalities generally associate a probability to a bound on the
expected value of a variable. Several such inequalities have been derived from
Markov’s inequality: Pr(X ≥ a) ≤ E[X ]/a. For instance, if one applies Markov’s
inequality to the random variable (X − E[X ])2, Chebyshev’s inequality will be
obtained, which is as follows:
Pr(|X − E[X ]| ≥ k
√
Var[X ]) ≤ 1
k2
(3)
where k is a constant. Chebyshev’s inequality is useful in bounding the mean of
a variable when the only information available about it is its variance.
Another useful inequality is that of Hoeffding, which provides an exponential
deviation bound. Hoeffding’s Theorem 2 [14] states that if S is the sum of m
independent random variables, X1, . . . , Xm, each of which is bounded by two
values, ai and bi, then the following inequality holds about S:
Pr(|S − E[S]| ≥ t) ≤ 2 exp
(
− 2t
2∑m
i=1(bi − ai)2
)
, (4)
Hoeffding’s inequality is particularly interesting as it implies that the probability
of a large deviation from the mean is exponentially small.
Recently, Vu presented an inequality which is concerned with variables that
have a distribution with have heavy tails [23]. In particular, it provides a devia-
tion bound of a function of independent variables, which has a general form and
satisfies a number of conditions (for more detail, see [23]). In Section 4, we will
use a special case of Vu’s general bound, tailored to our problem.
Obviously, since such inequalities can be applied to a random variable with
any arbitrary distribution, a bound developed based on them cannot be matched
in quality to one that is developed based on a given distribution.
4 Simple Random Sampling
In this section, we show the estimation error can be bounded in the cases where
the range or the variance of the marginal contributions of a player is given.
Our objective is to estimate the Shapley value of a player with probability at
least (1 − δ) that our estimation error is ǫ > 0. Hereafter, unless otherwise
indicated, the player index i and the characteristic function v are omitted from
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Input: Game (N, v), ǫ, δ
Output: φˆ // an array containing the approximated Shapley values
1 M ← GetLargestSampleSizeAmongAllPlayers(ǫ, δ)
2 ∀i ∈ N ; φˆ[i]← 0
3 for sample = 1 to M do
4 O ← GenerateUniformRandomPermutation(N)
5 forall the i ∈ N do
6 POi ← CalculateSetOfPrecedingPlayers(O, i)
7 ˆφ[i]← φˆ[i] + 1M × (v(POi ∪ {i})− v(POi ))
8 end
9 end
Algorithm 1: Simple Random Sampling Algorithm
all notations of the Shapley value for the sake of simplicity. Formally, we are
interested in finding the condition for the following inequality to hold:
Pr(|φˆ − φ| ≥ ǫ) ≤ δ (5)
where φˆ is the estimated Shapley value of a player of interest.
Using simple random sampling, we estimate φˆ as the mean of m random
samples, φ1, . . . , φm, taken from the population of marginal contributions of the
player. That is, φˆ = 1/m
∑m
j=1 φj . Based on this, for inequality (5) to hold, the
condition is that m must be sufficiently large. We will determine the minimum
required value for m in the case where either the variance is known (Section 4.1)
or the range is known (Section 4.2) for the players’ marginal contributions.
The sampling algorithm for the aforementioned cases is presented in Algo-
rithm 1. Note that it is possible to re-use a sample (i.e., permutation) for all
players; this will not affect the bound. In doing so, the number of samples re-
quired to approximate the Shapley value for all players would be equal to the
largest number of samples required for any one of those players.
4.1 Bounding the estimation error when the variance of marginal
contributions is known
Let us observe that the variance of the sum of a number of random variables is
equal to the sum of the variances of individual variables, i.e., Var[φ1+. . .+φm] =
Var[φ1]+ . . .+Var[φm]. In order to determine the minimum required sample size
when the maximum variance of the marginal contributions of a player, σ2, is
given, we can use Chebyshev’s inequality as follows. Let Y =
∑m
j=1 φj . Since
φˆ = 1/m × Y , application of inequality (3) to Y results in: Pr(|Y − E[Y ]| ≥
k
√
Var[Y ]) = Pr(| 1mY − φ| ≥ 1mk
√
Var[Y ]). Let ǫ be (k/m)
√
Var[Y ]. We have:
Pr(|φˆ− φ| ≥ ǫ) ≤ Var[Y ]
(mǫ)2
=
Var[φ1] + . . .+Var[φm]
(mǫ)2
=
σ2
mǫ2
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Since our aim is for the right hand side of the above inequality to be at most δ,
it follows that m ≥ ⌈σ2/(δǫ2)⌉.
4.2 Bounding the estimation error when the range of marginal
contributions is known
Given the range, r, of the marginal contributions of a player, we can use Ho-
effding’s inequality to determine the minimum value of m as follows. In inequal-
ity (4), let S =
∑m
j=1 φj . We have: Pr(|S − mφ| ≥ t) = Pr(|φˆ − φ| ≥ tm ).
Therefore:
Pr(|φˆ− φ| ≥ ǫ) ≤ 2 exp
(
−2m
2ǫ2
mr2
)
Since we want the right hand side to be bounded by δ, we have:
2 exp
(
−2mǫ
2
r2
)
≤ δ ⇒ −2mǫ
2
r2
≤ ln(δ
2
)
Therefore, the minimum required sample size is: m ≥ ⌈ ln( 2δ )r
2
2ǫ2 ⌉.
Observe that this estimation error has an upper bound of O(r/m). As such,
if r is large, it becomes dominant within the bound. Therefore, in this case, a
bound that is sublinear in r would be more preferable. Given this, in the rest
of this section, we aim to provide an improved bound for the estimation error
of the Shapley value. In particular, we provide a O(
√
r/m) bound, based on the
following theorem.
Theorem 1. Suppose that φ = O (rf(n) lnn) where n is the number of players,
0 < f(n) < 1 is an arbitrary function of n, and r is the range of marginal
contributions of a player of interest. There exist constants c, d > 0 such that
P (|φˆ− φ| ≥ ǫ) ≤ de−cmǫ
2
φ
Note that the condition φ = O (rf(n) lnn) reflects the fact that the marginal
contributions might be significantly much larger than the Shapley value (as
with heavy-tailed distributions). The proof of this theorem is a straightforward
application of Corollary 4.7 from [23], tailored to our problem, and thus, is
omitted. From this theorem, we can show that if m the number of samples our
algorithm takes, then with at least (1 − δ) probability, the estimation error of
the Shapley value is at most
|φˆ− φ| ≤
√
φ
(− ln δd)
cm
= O
(√
r lnn(− ln δ)
m
)
This implies that the estimation error has a form of O(
√
r/m) with high prob-
ability. Although this bound is more efficient in terms of r, it is less efficient
in terms of 1m . This is the trade-off compared to the previous case. Note that,
Bounding the Estimation Error of Shapley Value Approximation 9
in contrast to the results provided in the previous sections, this result does not
provide an exact bound, as the value of the coefficients is hidden in the big-O no-
tation. However, it still gives us a useful insight that even within cases of heavy
tail distributions, our algorithm can still provide low (i.e., O(
√
r)) estimation
error.
5 Stratified Sampling for Coalitions
In the sampling algorithm from the previous section, we were indifferent about
which area of the population to sample from. However, by dividing the popula-
tion into a number of homogeneous subpopulations (i.e., strata), it is possible to
optimise the number of samples taken from each strata. Provided that a popula-
tion has been stratified so that members of any stratum are as close as possible,
using stratified sampling will always achieve higher precision than simple ran-
dom sampling. Of course, this gain is higher when differences between the strata
are greater.
Suppose that the population of marginal contributions of a player can be
stratified into a number of strata, each containing marginal contributions with
similar values (i.e., values that are close to each other). Our hypothesis is that
it is possible to bound the estimation error more efficiently than the bounds in
the previous section. In so doing, we can use Hoeffding’s inequality to efficiently
bound the estimation error within each stratum. Note that within this section,
as opposed to the population of permutation of players, we sample from the
population of coalitions.
To demonstrate the aforementioned hypothesis, we prove that there exist two
values, a and b, such that ∀C ⊆ N , we have:
a|C| ≤ v(C) ≤ b|C|, (6)
where |C| is the size of coalition C. In particular, we show that by setting
a = min
C⊆N
v(C)
|C|
b = max
C⊆N
v(C)
|C|
we obtain the requested linear bounds given in (6). To prove this, first observe
that a and b exist, due to the fact that N is finite. By definition, for any C ⊆ N ,
we have:
a ≤ v(C)|C| ≤ b
This implies that the following holds
a|C| ≤ v(C) ≤ b|C|
Hereafter, we assume that (6) holds. Our objective is to distribute m samples
among k strata, such that the total estimation error of the Shapley value is
minimised.
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Now, without loss of generality, we estimate the Shapley value of player i.
By grouping the coalitions that do not contain {i}, based on their sizes, we have
n strata S0, S1, . . . , Sn−1 such that Sk = {C ⊆ N \ {i}, |C| = k} contains all
the coalitions with size k. Let rk denote the range of marginal contributions of
player i within group Sk. It is easy to show that
rk ≤ 2(b− a)(|C| + 1) = d (k + 1) , (7)
where d = 2(b − a) (note that |C| = k as C ∈ Sk). In particular, let rmin and
rmax denote the minimum and maximum marginal contribution value of agent i
within group Sk. It is easy to show that
rmax ≤ (b− a)k + b
(a− b)k + a ≤ rmin
In fact, the first inequality holds because v(C ∪ {i}) ≤ b(k + 1) and v(C) ≥ ak.
Similarly, the second inequality holds because v(C ∪{i}) ≥ a(k+1) and v(C) ≤
bk. Since rk = rmax − rmin, we obtain that rk ≤ 2(b− a)(k + 1).
Let φk denote the expected marginal contribution of the player within stra-
tum Sk. That is, we have:
φk =
1
|Sk|
∑
|C|=k,{i}6∈C
(v(C ∪ {i})− v(C))
=
1(
n−1
k
) ∑
|C|=k,{i}6∈C
(v(C ∪ {i})− v(C)) (8)
It is obvious that the Shapley value of this player can be calculated as follows:
φ =
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
φk. (9)
In fact, we have:
φ =
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
φk =
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
1(
n−1
k
) ∑
|C|=k,{i}6∈C
(v(C ∪ {i})− v(C))
which is equivalent to the definition of the Shapley value given in (2).
Let φ and φk denote the (global) Shapley value and the expected value of
stratum k, respectively. Furthermore, denote by mk the number of samples we
take from stratum Sk, and denote by φˆ
k
mk
the estimation of φk usingmk samples.
Based on Hoeffding’s inequality ((4)), we have:
|φˆkmk − φk| ≤
√
r2k
(− ln δ2)
2mk
≤ d(k + 1)
√(− ln δ2)
2mk
(10)
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with at least (1− δ) probability. The second inequality comes from equation (7).
Let φˆ denote the estimated (global) Shapley value of player i, which can be
calculated as:
φˆ =
1
n
n−1∑
k=0
φˆk. (11)
Given this, the total estimation error of φ can be estimated as follows:
|φˆ− φ| ≤ 1
n
n−1∑
k=0
|φˆk − φk|. (12)
Equation (10) implies that for any 0 < β < 1, by setting δ = 1 − (1 − β)1/n,
then with at least (1− β) probability, we have:
|φˆ− φ| ≤ 1
n
n−1∑
k=0
d(k + 1)
√(− ln δ2)
2mk
=
d
√(
− ln 1−(1−β)
1/n
2
)
2
n
n−1∑
k=0
(k + 1)√
mk
(13)
Hence, in order to achieve efficiently low estimation error, we aim to minimise
the following optimisation problem:
Determine m1, . . . ,mn such that
min
n−1∑
k=0
(k + 1)√
mk
is achieved, subject to
n−1∑
k=0
mk ≤ m
Now, note that this is a hard optimisation problem, as mk has to be integer.
However, if we relax the problem such that mk are allowed to be fractional, then
the optimal (fractional) m∗k can be easily calculated (e.g., by using the Lagrange
relaxation approach). In particular, we can easily show that ∀k:
m∗k =
m (k + 1)
2
3∑n−1
j=0 (j + 1)
2
3
(14)
Given this, we can set the value of mk = ⌊m∗k⌋. However, this implies that
there may be additional samples left unused as
∑n−1
k=0 mk may be lower than
m. In this case, we sequentially increase the value of mk with 1 from k = 0 to
(n− 1) until we exceed m. The pseudocode of this stratified sampling algorithm
can be found in Algorithm 2. Note that it is easy to show that mk ≥ m
∗
k
2 . These
results together imply that with at least (1 − δ)n, the total estimation error of
the Shapley value is at most:
|φˆ− φ| ≤
d
√
− ln δ2
n
√
m
(
n−1∑
k=0
(k + 1)
2
3
) 3
2
. (15)
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Input: Game (N, v), m, δ
Output: φˆ // an array containing the approximated Shapley values
1 ∀i ∈ N ; φˆ[i]← 0
2 forall the i ∈ N do
3 ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . n} ; Sk ← GetAllCoalitionsWithSize(k)
4 ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . n} ; mk =
⌊
m(k+1)
2
3∑n−1
j=0 (j+1)
2
3
⌋
5 if m−∑mk > 0 then
6 UniformlyDistributeRemainingSamplesAmongStrata()
7 end
8 ∀k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , i− 1, i+ 1, . . . n} ; φˆk[i]← AverageOfStratum(k)
9 φˆ[i]← AverageOfAllStrata()
10 end
Algorithm 2: Stratified Random Sampling Algorithm
By using the generalised inequality between two power means for 23 and 1, we
can further bound this estimation error with:
|φˆ− φ| ≤
d
√
− ln δ2
n
√
m
n−1∑
k=0
(k + 1) =
d
√
− ln 1−(1−β)1/n2√
m
n+ 1
2
. (16)
since
∑n−1
k=0 (k + 1) =
n(n+1)
2 . This estimation bound is indeed very efficient,
especially when the number of samples m is sufficiently large, compared to n,
the number of players. To demonstrate this, we compare this error bound with
the error estimation that we could get by using simple random sampling, but
only by using Hoeffding’s inequality on the whole m samples. It is easy to show
that the latter estimation is at least d
√
n (− ln δ2 ), which is significantly higher
(i.e., worse), compared to the error bound given in equation (16), if m > (n+1)
2
4 .
6 Conclusions and Future Work
In this paper, we considered the problem of approximating the Shapley value
in the general class of characteristic function games. While the state-of-the-art
algorithm in the literature provides an asymptotic bound, we used two con-
centration inequalities to establish non-asymptotic bounds. This was done for
cases where the variance or the range of the players’ marginal contributions is
known. We also showed how to improve the bound in cases where the range is
significantly large relative to the Shapley value. Finally, we proposed the use of
the stratified sampling technique, and demonstrated its effectiveness in improv-
ing the bounds. In the future, we will focus on extending the use of stratified
sampling techniques to classes of interest such as weighted voting games.
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